AFPAbu Mohammed al-Jawlani spoke to supporters at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus shortly after Bashar al-Assad was overthrown.
Syrian rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, formerly known by his jihadist alias, has adopted his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in official statements since last Thursday, prior to the fall of President Bashar al-Assad. This change is part of Jawlani’s efforts to establish his credibility in a new context as the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a militant group that, along with other rebel factions, has seized control of Damascus, consolidating its hold over much of Syria.
Jawlani’s evolution has been a gradual process, evident not only in his public declarations and interactions with international media but also in his changing appearance. Once dressed in traditional jihadist attire, he has transitioned to a more Western-style wardrobe in recent years. Now, as he leads the offensive, he is back in military fatigues, reflecting his role as the commander of the operations.
But who is Jawlani, or Ahmed al-Sharaa, and what led to his transformation?
The IS-Iraq Connection
In a 2021 interview with PBS, Jawlani disclosed that he was born in Saudi Arabia in 1982, where his father worked as an oil engineer until 1989. The family then returned to Syria, where Jawlani grew up in the Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus.
Jawlani’s involvement in jihadist activities began in Iraq, where he was connected to al-Qaeda through the precursor to the Islamic State (IS) group, initially known as al-Qaeda in Iraq and later as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Following the US-led invasion in 2003, he joined other foreign fighters in Iraq and was imprisoned at Camp Bucca in 2005, where he deepened his ties to jihadist groups and met Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who would later become the leader of IS.
In 2011, Baghdadi sent Jawlani to Syria with funding to establish al-Nusra Front, a covert faction linked to ISI. By 2012, Nusra had become a significant force in Syria, concealing its connections to IS and al-Qaeda.
Tensions escalated in 2013 when Baghdadi unilaterally announced the merger of ISI and Nusra, forming the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS). Jawlani resisted this move, leading to a split due to his desire to distance Nusra from the violent tactics of ISI.
To navigate this situation, Jawlani pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, making Nusra Front its Syrian branch. From the start, he focused on gaining support from Syrians, distancing himself from IS’s brutality and advocating for a more pragmatic approach to jihad.
Joining Al-Qaeda
In April 2013, al-Nusra Front became al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, furthering the divide between Nusra and IS. While Jawlani’s decision was partly aimed at maintaining local backing and avoiding alienating Syrians and rebel groups, the al-Qaeda association did not bring the intended benefits.
The challenge intensified in 2015 when Nusra and other factions took control of Idlib province, leading to collaboration in its governance. In 2016, Jawlani broke ties with al-Qaeda, rebranding the group as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017.
Despite the public split from al-Qaeda and multiple name changes, HTS remained designated as a terrorist organization by the US, UK, and other nations, with a $10 million reward offered for information on Jawlani’s whereabouts.
Establishing a ‘Government’ in Idlib
Under Jawlani’s leadership, HTS emerged as the dominant force in Idlib, the largest rebel stronghold in north-west Syria. To address concerns about a militant group ruling the area, HTS created the Syrian Salvation Government (SG) in 2017 as its political and administrative arm.
The SG functioned as a quasi-state, with ministries overseeing sectors such as education, health, and reconstruction, along with a religious council guided by Islamic law. Jawlani engaged with the public through visits to displacement camps and events, emphasizing aid efforts and governance achievements, particularly during crises like the 2023 earthquakes.
HTS aimed to showcase its ability to govern and provide stability and services, drawing inspiration from the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. By prioritizing governance, infrastructure, and public services, Jawlani sought to present Idlib as a successful model under HTS rule, enhancing both the group’s legitimacy and his own political ambitions.
However, HTS faced challenges in consolidating power, facing protests from hardline Islamists and Syrian activists critical of its rule. Critics accused HTS of authoritarianism, suppressing dissent, and aligning with international actors instead of focusing on combatting government forces.
To address these concerns, HTS implemented reforms, disbanded controversial security forces, and established a grievance department for citizens to voice complaints. Despite these efforts, HTS continued to walk a fine line between projecting a modern image to win over the local population and maintaining its Islamist identity.
Leading a New Path?
As HTS and its allies launched an offensive that resulted in the overthrow of Assad, Jawlani’s jihadist past came under scrutiny, leading some supporters to question his leadership. Despite previous indications of willingness to dissolve the group, Jawlani’s recent actions suggest a different trajectory.
HTS’s success in uniting rebels and advancing swiftly across Syria has bolstered Jawlani’s position, silencing critics and accusations of opportunism. As HTS consolidates power and suppresses dissent, the group continues to navigate the delicate balance between projecting a moderate image and appeasing hardline elements within its ranks.
Jawlani’s journey from a jihadist militant to a political leader reflects the complex dynamics of the Syrian conflict, highlighting the challenges of reconciling ideological principles with governance and public expectations in a post-Assad era.