But the reality of their actions was far more sinister. Their targets included journalists critical of the Russian government, Ukrainian soldiers, and individuals who had fallen out of favor with powerful figures in Russia. The use of private flights, sophisticated technology, and a network of spies showed a level of planning and coordination that went beyond the realm of traditional espionage.
As the trial at the Old Bailey concluded, it became clear that the reach of Russian intelligence operations was far-reaching and involved a network of non-Russian nationals working on behalf of the state. The use of Bulgarians like Roussev, Dzhambazov, Ivanova, Gaberova, and Ivanchev allowed Russian intelligence to operate at arm’s length, avoiding direct connections to the Russian state.
The discovery of the spy gadgetry at the Haydee Hotel in Great Yarmouth, along with the trove of Telegram messages detailing their activities, provided concrete evidence of their espionage activities. The use of crypto wallets and bank transfers to fund their operations further underscored the level of planning and organization involved.
Ultimately, the trial shed light on the new tactics and strategies employed by Russian intelligence agencies in the wake of the implosion of their networks in Europe. The use of non-Russian nationals to carry out espionage activities, the reliance on sophisticated technology, and the willingness to resort to kidnapping and other illegal activities marked a dangerous evolution in the world of espionage.
The trial of Marsalek, Roussev, Dzhambazov, and Ivanova shed light on the elaborate but often ineffective espionage activities carried out by the group. Despite their aspirations to be seen as professional intelligence officers, their surveillance efforts on targets like Christo Grozev and Roman Dobrokhotov did not yield significant results. The planned surveillance of the US army base in Stuttgart, which involved hiding an IMSI device to track mobile phones, was deemed too risky and never executed.
While Roussev was skilled at recruiting individuals to gather information and had access to high-quality forged documents, the group’s actual success in gathering valuable intelligence was questionable. Grozev’s stolen laptop, for example, turned out to be unremarkable once analyzed in Moscow, and Grozev himself was unaware that it had been taken.
Despite their grandiose plans and bravado in Telegram chats, the group’s activities were often portrayed as more amateurish than sophisticated. The trial highlighted the gap between their aspirations as spies and the reality of their largely ineffective operations. Ultimately, the case underscored the importance of caution and expertise in the world of espionage, as well as the potential consequences of overreaching in pursuit of intelligence goals. The operation was intended to gather intelligence on NATO’s capabilities in the region, an area that has been of increasing concern to Moscow since the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The messages also reveal that the group had plans to target other European countries, including France and the UK, using similar methods.
In the end, the operation was thwarted by a combination of luck and the diligence of the German authorities. Roussev was arrested in Stuttgart in December 2021, shortly after the operation was set to begin. Gaberova, who had been assisting the group, was also taken into custody. Dzhambazov managed to evade capture and is believed to be in hiding.
The case has raised questions about the extent of Russian intelligence activities in Europe and the lengths to which they are willing to go to achieve their goals. As tensions between Russia and the West continue to escalate, it is likely that similar operations will be attempted in the future. The challenge for European security services will be to remain vigilant and prevent such activities from succeeding. Menurut Soldatov, model operasi Marsalek sebagai agen bebas antara lembaga adalah hal yang normal diinisiasi oleh tentara bayaran Rusia Yevgeny Prigozhin — yang Wagner Group-nya beroperasi “secara jarak jauh” dari GRU, melaksanakan operasi atas nama mereka di seluruh Afrika, Amerika Selatan, dan Asia.”Kami telah mendeteksi beberapa kasus di mana Anda memiliki orang-orang yang sepertinya beroperasi seperti agen bebas dengan kontak yang sangat baik memainkan [GRU dan FSB] satu sama lain, menjual produk kepada mereka, dan selalu ada di pasar,” kata Soldatov. Ini terutama merupakan ciri khas dari hubungan Rusia dengan para penjahat cyber, yang diberi tugas oleh agen mata-mata untuk operasi peretasan terhadap target-target tertentu. Keahlian Marsalek dalam pembayaran keuangan, yang dapat digunakan untuk membantu menyembunyikan transaksi sensitif, akan sangat membantu baik FSB maupun GRU, menurut seseorang yang akrab dengan operasi mereka.Dobrokhotov — jurnalis Rusia yang disurvei oleh kelompok Bulgaria — mengatakan bahwa dia memiliki bukti bahwa Marsalek bekerja untuk unit FSB yang sama yang mengevakuasinya ke Rusia setelah Wirecard runtuh. “Sangat logis bahwa mereka meminta orang yang mereka kendalikan untuk membantu mereka menyelidiki [sasaran] di Eropa di mana mereka tidak memiliki sumber daya,” kata Dobrokhotov. “Mereka membutuhkan koneksi-koneksinya.”Meskipun Marsalek saat ini menjadi subjek perhatian Interpol atas perannya dalam penipuan Wirecard, dia belum dijerat dengan kegiatan spionase apapun. Namun hal ini bisa berubah. Surat perintah penangkapan Austria untuk mantan petugas polisi dan intelijen Egisto Ott, yang dilihat oleh FT, menuduh bahwa Marsalek menugaskan Ott atas nama GRU dan FSB sejak tahun 2017. (Ott, yang menunggu persidangan, sebelumnya menolak bukti terhadapnya sebagai “permainan”.) Pihak berwenang Austria sedang menyelidiki operasi mata-mata Marsalek, menurut pejabat pemerintah. Polisi Inggris mengatakan bahwa saat ini Marsalek dicari di Inggris, namun penyelidikan mereka masih berlangsung.Sementara itu, penipu buronan ini tampaknya beradaptasi dengan baik dengan karir barunya — dan tampaknya mendapatkan wawasan yang lebih dalam tentang kekurangan intelijen Moskow. Suatu sore pada bulan Januari 2022, Roussev dan Marsalek memulai hobi favorit mereka: mengeluh tentang tidak bergunanya kontak mata-mata Rusia yang telah memberikan detail lokasi tentang target yang ternyata hampir seminggu kedaluwarsa.”Saya sungguh merasa menyesal untuk Anda harus berurusan dengan orang-orang ‘luar biasa’ dan ‘efisien’ itu,” tulis Roussev dengan nada sinis. “Terima kasih, Pak,” balas Marsalek. “Ini membuka mata untuk melihat bagaimana hal ini sebenarnya bekerja dari dalam.”Laporan tambahan oleh Sam Jones di Wina.